Type A
|
Code |
Competences Specific | | A1 |
Explain how the economy works on both the macroeconomic and microeconomic.
|
| A2 |
Students master the basic methods and tools for analyzing business reality.
|
Type B
|
Code |
Competences Transversal | | B2 |
Effective solutions to complex problems |
Type C
|
Code |
Competences Nuclear | | C1 |
Have an intermediate mastery of a foreign language, preferably English |
| C4 |
Be able to express themselves correctly both orally and in writing in one of the two official languages of the URV |
Type A
|
Code |
Learning outcomes |
| A1 |
Analyze the behavior of producers in different market structures.
Analyze individual decision making in situations of uncertainty.
Analyze situations of strategic interaction.
Analyze situations in which information is asymmetric.
| | A2 |
Master the basic concepts and tools of decision theory.
Master the basic concepts and tools of non-cooperative game theory.
|
Type B
|
Code |
Learning outcomes |
| B2 |
Draw up strategies to solve problems.
Find appropriate solutions.
|
Type C
|
Code |
Learning outcomes |
| C1 |
Understand instructions about classes or tasks assigned by the teaching staff.
Understand routine information and articles.
Understand the general meaning of texts that have non-routine information in a familiar subject area.
Take notes during a class.
| | C4 |
Produce well-structured, clear and rich written texts
|
Topic |
Sub-topic |
Part I: GAME THEORY |
|
Unit 1. Static games |
1.1 Normal-form game
1.2 Rationality and information
1.3 Solutions of static games
|
Unit 2. Dynamic games |
2.1 Extensive-form games
2.2 Solutions of dynamic games
2.3 Repeated games |
Part II: MARKETS AND MARKET STRUCTURES |
|
Unit 3. Monopoly |
3.1 Concept and causes of monopoly
3.2 Monopoly profit maximization
3.3 Comparing monopoly and perfect
competition: Welfare cost of monopoly
3.4 Price discrimination
3.5 Natural monopoly
|
Unit 4. Oligopoly
|
4.1 Cournot model of duopoly
4.2 Collusion
4.3 Cartel stability
4.4 Stackelberg model of duopoly
4.5 Entry barriers
4.6 Bertrand model of duopoly |
Part III: DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION |
|
Unit 5. Choice under uncertainty |
5.1 Expected utility theory
5.2 Risk aversion
5.3 Applications |
Unit 6. Asymmetric information
|
6.1 Moral hazard
6.2 Adverse selection
6.3 Signaling
6.4 Principal-agent problem |
Methodologies :: Tests |
|
Competences |
(*) Class hours
|
Hours outside the classroom
|
(**) Total hours |
Introductory activities |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
Lecture |
|
42 |
63 |
105 |
Problem solving, classroom exercises |
|
11 |
22 |
33 |
Personal tuition |
|
0.5 |
0 |
0.5 |
|
Practical tests |
|
6 |
1.5 |
7.5 |
Mixed tests |
|
2 |
0 |
2 |
|
(*) On e-learning, hours of virtual attendance of the teacher. (**) The information in the planning table is for guidance only and does not take into account the heterogeneity of the students. |
Methodologies
|
Description |
Introductory activities |
Activities designed to make contact with students, collect information from them and introduce the subject. |
Lecture |
Description of the contents of the subject. |
Problem solving, classroom exercises |
Formulation, analysis, resolution and debate of a problem or exercise related to the topic of the subject. |
Personal tuition |
Time that each teacher has to speak to pupils and resolve their doubts.
|
Description |
On the first day of classes students will receive information about how and when can they contact the professors to solve queries and questions of the subject. |
Methodologies |
Competences
|
Description |
Weight |
|
|
|
|
Practical tests |
|
This subject is divided in three parts. The students will take three exams throughout the course (15% each).
|
45% |
Mixed tests |
|
The students will take a final exam about all the contents of the subject. |
55% |
Others |
|
|
|
|
Other comments and second exam session |
No es permet l'ús o tinença de dispositius de comunicació i transmissió de dades durant la realització de les proves. En la segona convocatòria l'alumne haurà de realitzar un examen final del contingut global de l'assignatura. La seva qualificació representarà el 100% de la nota. |
Basic |
Gadner, R. , Juegos para empresarios y economistas, , Antoni Bosch
Gibbons, R. , Un primer curso en teoría de juegos, , Antoni Bosch
Nicholson, W., Teoría Microeconomica: Principios básicos y aplicaciones, 7ª edició, McGraw-Hill
Pindyck, R. S. i D. L. Rubinfeld , Microeconomía, 7ª edició, Prentice Hall
Varian, Hal R. , Microeconomía intermedia: un enfoque actual, 7ª edició, Antoni Bosch
|
|
Complementary |
Gravelle, H. i R. Ress, Microeconomía, 3ª edició, Pearson Prentice Hall
|
|
Subjects that continue the syllabus |
ECONOMIC THEORY OF WELFARE/16224108 | PUBLIC ECONOMICS/16224111 | THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION/16224109 |
|
Subjects that it is recommended to have taken before |
MATHEMATICS I/16224008 | MATHEMATICS II/16224009 | INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS/16224004 |
|
(*)The teaching guide is the document in which the URV publishes the information about all its courses. It is a public document and cannot be modified. Only in exceptional cases can it be revised by the competent agent or duly revised so that it is in line with current legislation. |
|